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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing awareness in legal scholarship that a crisis of sorts pervades the legal field.
In the now famous The Lost Lawyer, Dean Anthony Kronman has identified an adverse
transformation of the character of the legal profession. n1 Professor Mary Anne Glendon has put
forth a critique of the rights-based rhetoric that predominates legal discourse. n2 Professor Steven
Smith has both broadened and deepened these discouraging observations by suggesting that the
legal community is suffering from a crisis of faith. As Smith astutely points out, there is a
fundamental problem with the integrity of legal discourse in that legal actors operate in a state of
discordance between their beliefs and practices. Participants in this discourse have come to take for
granted that the reasons they present in support of their positions are quite distinct from the "real
reasons" that underlie  [*1034]  them.  n3 Smith coined this duplicity a "schizophrenic condition,"
suggesting that it is a "sign of something deeply wrong in modern legal thought." n4
This paper explores the possibility that judicial reasoning might be one of the causes of this state
of duplicity. This proposition is explored through an analysis of the work of Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo, an exemplary and distinguished inhabitant of the American judicial pantheon. I will
briefly review recent scholarship that champions his legacy as the product of renaissance-like
qualities: encompassing brilliant judicial performance and insightful writing about judging. I will
suggest that this resurgent literature fails to identify a troubling conflict that pervades Cardozo's
legacy. Oddly, this conflict has been instrumental in making him so successful in the eyes of
generations of lawyers, scholars, and, above all, judges.
Cardozo's greatness is considered by many to be second only to that of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. The roster of Cardozo's devotees is studded with the caliber of the likes of Learned Hand, n5
Harlan Fiske Stone, n6 Henry J. Friendly, n7 William Brennan, Jr., n8 Judith Kaye, n9 Ruggero
Aldisert, n10 Patricia Wald, n11 Shirley  [*1035]  Abrahamson, n12 Robert Keeton, n13 Alvin
Rubin, n14 Bernard Schwartz, n15 and Richard Weisberg. n16
Though at the same time, Cardozo's legacy has been dogged by persistent skepticism. The
sizeable and hardly dismissible chorus of detractors includes Jerome Frank (strangely disguising
himself under the pseudonym Anon Y. Mous), n17 Edward Levi, n18 Grant Gilmore, n19 Leon
Lipson, n20 John Noonan, n21 William Powers, n22 and G. Edward White. n23 A central theme in
this line of criticism is that Cardozo was a disingenuous judge. n24 Moreover, scholars continue to
question what is it about this judge that makes him so  [*1036]  great. Implicitly, these ongoing
inquiries keep alive a lingering doubt as to Cardozo's greatness. True greatness, it would seem, does
not require constant affirmation.
Recent scholarship has given Cardozo's legacy a boost. In a book entitled Cardozo: A Study in
Reputation, Richard Posner advances an original approach towards the examination of judicial
careers. Inspired by the doubts revolving around Cardozo's legacy, Posner set out to test whether, as
an empirical matter, Cardozo was indeed a prominent figure within the judicial tradition. n25
Posner concludes that the credentials are well deserved. n26
The Cardozo debate reached a highpoint, perhaps the point of saturation, with the publication of
Professor Andrew Kaufman's compendious biography entitled, plainly, Cardozo. n27 Forty years in
the making, extensively researched, heavily footnoted and encompassing in scope, Kaufman's 731-
page book bears an aura of finality. At the most rudimentary level, this book amounts to an almanac
of Cardozo's life (at least of what remains after the destruction of his private papers). With regard to
Cardozo's personality, Kaufman's work was cut out for him. Previous opinions of the man ranged
from intimations of sainthood n28 and laudatory biographical sketches, n29 to loaded charges of
sneakiness and phoniness. n30 Kaufman lands safely somewhere in the midst. He describes
Cardozo as a kind, courteous and gentle person, n31 but also acknowledges that "he was no saint.
He was simply a good  [*1037]  man, with ordinary human failings that included some prejudices."
n32
Much of Kaufman's work is devoted to warding off the charges that Cardozo's judicial decisions
were result-oriented rather than principle-driven, and correspondingly, that the opinions supporting
these decisions were insincere. In this vein, Kaufman combed laboriously through a mass of
Cardozo's judicial opinions to show that Cardozo's results were principled and consistent. While
acknowledging Cardozo's occasional misjudgment (how could there be none?), Kaufman concludes
convincingly that Cardozo's decisions were not exceptionally result-oriented. Kaufman also goes to
great lengths to defend Cardozo from the charge that his decisions relied too heavily on dodgy
reasoning and skewed renditions of factual bases. Here Kaufman's success is incomplete. n33 It is
interesting to note that on both counts, Cardozo would have settled for less protection than Kaufman
struggles to provide him. n34
The part of the project that is obviously most precious to Kaufman is the book's final chapter,
entitled "Legacy." While maintaining  [*1038]  the studious tone that is present throughout the
biography, Kaufman ties his momentous research together and imparts the imprimatur of greatness
on Cardozo's career. Cardozo, Kaufman concludes, was "a great judge" n35 who "remains in the
public memory as a standard of judicial excellence." n36 He "deserves the high place that he has
held in the judicial hall of fame." n37
Kaufman's biography has been well received within the legal profession, n38 as it has among
most legal academics, who have described it as "beautifully crafted, thorough, perceptive,
balanced," n39 "magnificent" and a "masterful job." n40 The book has also been tagged as a
"venerable biographical project," an "epic judicial biography," n41 a "model judicial biography"
n42 and the "definitive" Cardozo biography. n43 The skeptical voices of William Powers, Jr. n44
and John Goldberg n45 are barely heard amidst  [*1039]  this chorus of praise.
Most consistently enthusiastic reviews have come from the judicial rank. Judge Keeton has
lauded the book as a "stellar, strikingly creative, and original contribution." n46 Other members of
the bench have praised it as a "stunning intellectual biography," n47 a biography "most definitely ...
worth the wait" of forty years, n48 and a "great work." n49 Former critic of Cardozo, now judge,
John T. Noonan, Jr., has described the book as "a major event in the world of law, judicial
biography and legal literature." n50 And Richard Posner is captured on the book's jacket endorsing
it as "perhaps the best biography of a major American judge ever written." Kaufman's Cardozo,
then, seems to have the potential to quell the lingering misgivings and afford his subject a more
tranquil tenure in the pantheon. n51
This essay does not question whether Cardozo's legacy is appropriately branded with the label
of greatness. The reputation of an icon is best treated as a positive fact susceptible to empirical
verification. By these terms, Cardozo was indeed a "great" judge. n52 Rather, the inquiry conducted
here continues the examination of the reasons for his eminence. Obviously, Cardozo harbored an
impressive array of talents and personality  [*1040]  characteristics that are necessary ingredients
for the making of a successful career in such a scrutinized social role. n53 He was also an ambitious
judge (aren't all icons?). n54 There might, however, be more to the making of Cardozo's legacy.
A central assessment shared by most extant analyses of Cardozo's work is that his greatness is
the product of a combination of his judicial performance and his extra-judicial writings. For
instance, Posner argues that Cardozo's ability to write fine and demystifying statements of his
decision-making process, compounded with his outstandingness as a judge, "both lends authority to
his statement of his judicial philosophy and enables the statement to reinforce his judicial
reputation." n55 Similarly, Kaufman explains that Cardozo's enduring importance is derived from
the fit between his opinions and his approach to judging: "He declared his views in The Nature of
the Judicial Process ... and exemplified them in his judicial opinions." n56 Judith Kaye also
suggests that a central factor of his greatness was that he  [*1041]  elucidated his craft in his extra-
judicial writing. n57 The fusion of Cardozo's judicial and extra-judicial writing figures prominently
also in the works of Richard Weisberg, n58 Richard Friedman, n59 and Mark Silverstein. n60
I argue that herein lies a crucial misconception of Cardozo's life project. It seems that these
assessments manifest a failure to resist a temptation, common among biographers, of imposing
synchronic, if not diachronic, coherence on the life of their subjects. n61 To understand Cardozo
and his legacy, we should go beyond the view that treats his enterprise as a single, uniform  [*1042]
project. A close observation reveals instead an uneasy tension running through the corpus of his
work, namely, that his practice as a judge was profoundly inconsistent with the account of judging
he offered in his off-bench writings. This discrepancy will be presented in the first part of this essay.
In the second part, I explore some of the difficulties associated with the maintenance of this
discrepancy and offer an explanation grounded in psychological research. The final part of the essay
is devoted to an examination of how the coexistence of incompatible accounts affected Cardozo's
legacy. I will first suggest that the incompatible accounts facilitated the maintenance of conflicting
aspects of his professional life. I then will agree with extant assessments that Cardozo's reputation
relies heavily on the combined effect of his judicial and extra-judicial work, though it is for a very
different reason. Specifically, it is not because these two facets complemented or reinforced one
another; rather, it is the profound incompatibility between the two facets that has contributed to
Cardozo's vitality as a judicial icon and an exemplar for generations of judges. To this day, these
incompatible accounts continue to produce a type of jurisprudence that embodies the discrepancy
that pervaded Cardozo's life project. While this jurisprudence serves judges in fulfilling their testing
social role, it takes a toll on the integrity of judicial reasoning. The ultimate objective of this essay
extends beyond the legacy of that enigmatic, elusive judge now dead for sixty years. By
appreciating what makes Cardozo great to us, we might better understand the legal culture from
which we judge him so.
I
THE DISCREPANT ACCOUNTS OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
A. Cardozo's Account of Judging in Off-Bench Writings
Cardozo wrote extensively on the judicial process, and more than any other judge he ventured to
capture the mental processes by which judges arrive at their decisions. Thanks to his rare
introspection, he has bequeathed us a rich account of this complex activity. n62 His major
contribution was, of course, The Nature of the Judicial Process, but he revisited this subject in three
books and a number of essays published in the subsequent eleven  [*1043]  years. n63
Cardozo's account of judging derives from his basic observation that legal questions that come
before the appellate judge are not readily deduced from an orderly conceptual system of precepts:
"The common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to
conclusions derived from them deductively." n64 The tasks the judge faces are complex, difficult,
and replete with clashes between seemingly irreconcilable opposites; he explained: "Deep beneath
the surface of the legal system, hidden in the structure of the constituent atoms, are these attractions
and repulsions, uniting and dissevering as in one unending paradox." n65 Everything is "penetrated
with casuistry and dialectics." n66 Cardozo's portrayal of the law resonates with the best of legal
realism: "The whole subject-matter of jurisprudence is more plastic, more malleable, the moulds
less definitely cast, the bounds of right and wrong less preordained and constant, than most of us,
without the aid of some such analysis, have been accustomed to believe." n67
A central feature of Cardozo's characterization of the judicial process is a debunking of the then
prevalent view of the oracular judge, whose role was perceived as merely finding and pronouncing
the extant law. Rather, he insisted that the judicial role necessarily entails creation of law. The
Nature of the Judicial Process is based on the premise that "judge-made law [is] one of  [*1044]  the
existing realities of life." n68 In the paragraph that contains the book's title, Cardozo described his
own intellectual transformation:
As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature of
the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation.... n69
 Creation of law, Cardozo insisted, entails choice among alternative decisions. He announced
that "we must 'spread the gospel that there is no gospel that will save us from the pain of choosing at
every step.'" n70 He added that within the gaps of the law, "choice moves with a freedom which
stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made. The
process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom." n71 Indeed, the prevalence of choice is
emphasized throughout his writing. n72
The ever-present need to make choices renders the judicial process susceptible to human
fallibility. Cardozo refused to "underrate the tribulations of the process": n73 judges are afflicted by
"misgivings," n74 they are generally "uncertain of [their] strength," and "beset with doubts and
difficulties." n75 The decision-making process is inherently human: "Deep below consciousness are
other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge."
n76 As a judge, Cardozo insisted, one cannot free oneself  [*1045]  from "the empire of inarticulate
emotion," nor from the "beliefs so ingrained and inveterate as to be a portion of our very nature."
n77 In a passage that has become famous, Cardozo added: "We may try to see things as objectively
as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own." n78 Even the
most scrupulously executed decision-making process cannot escape the human element: "After the
wearisome process of analysis has been finished, there must be for every judge a new synthesis
which he will have to make for himself." n79
The result of this creative process, then, cannot be anything but imperfect. Making decisions is
akin to groping in the dark, n80 an exercise of testing and retesting hypotheses, n81 a process
informed by "a hint, an illustration, a suggestion." n82 In line with his propensity for self-
deprecation, Cardozo compared himself to a designer of "a mighty bridge." He lamented: "My
bridges are experiments. I cannot span the tiniest stream in a region unexplored by judges or
lawgivers before me, and go to rest in the secure belief that the span is wisely laid." n83 Cardozo
conceded also that his opinions reveal "all sorts of cracks and crevices and loopholes." n84
In sum, Cardozo portrayed the judicial process as embedded in an environment that is replete
with gaps and ambiguities. Fallible people are called on to solve these intricate, seemingly
intractable problems, with no obvious solution simply waiting to be  [*1046]  found. The making of
decisions inevitably entails creation of law, and the results of the process are bound to be subjective
and somewhat imprecise.
This is not to say that Cardozo held a view of radical indeterminacy. n85 He explained that at
times the judicial task will amount to no more than matching the case to the extant precedents,
"much like matching a new color to a sample of colors spread out on the desk." However, for him,
simple matching did not capture the essence of the judicial process: "It is when the colors do not
match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious
business of the judge begins." n86 Overall, Cardozo's account of the process of making a judicial
decision can be characterized as openness.
B. Cardozo's Practice as a Judge
 A radically different characterization emerges, however, from Cardozo's work as a judge. One of
the most notable features of Cardozo's opinions is their distinct sense of obvious correctness. n87
His reasoning is typically cast in the mold of formalism, n88 following established doctrines as a
matter of perceived necessity. n89 Even when the law was unclear, his conclusions appeared routine
and compelling. n90 Cardozo's opinions rarely left unresolved issues in their wake. Friend and
former clerk Joseph Rauh described that, in arriving at his decision, Cardozo would "explore and
explode the obstructions which stood in the way of  [*1047]  the fair result." n91 Learned Hand
reported that Cardozo's opinions had an "unerring accuracy." n92 Karl Llewellyn observed that "no
judge has ever had a stronger urge to leave an opinion in clean harmony with the authorities." n93
Another distinguishing feature of Cardozo's judicial work is the absence of doubt in the
decisions he reached. As H.V. Evatt observed, Cardozo "presented a strange spectacle, a judge who,
in every word he wrote, showed that he had thoroughly enjoyed his search for the just judgment but
in the end had resolved all doubts." n94 Justice Stone commented that when Cardozo reached his
decision, his uncertainties were cast aside in "serene and justified confidence." n95 As Hand
observed, at the point of resolution, he seemed "inflexible." n96
The following anecdote reported by Ambrose Doskow, one of Cardozo's clerks, is telling.
Justice Brandeis approached Doskow and said: "The trouble with [Cardozo] is that he thinks that he
has to be one hundred percent right. He doesn't realize that it is enough to be fifty-one percent
right." Upon learning of Brandeis' comment, Cardozo responded: "The trouble with that is that
when you are only fifty-one percent right, it may be forty-nine percent." n97 This urge to attain high
levels of exactness and certitude is a distinctive characteristic of Cardozo's judicial work.
As the foregoing discussion relates, Cardozo's actual opinions portray the judicial process as
perfectly capable of providing obviously correct solutions to legal questions. These inevitable
solutions can be found within extant legal doctrines. The process, then, is impersonal, and it
requires little judicial creativity. Overall, Cardozo's actual judicial practice resonates with
Langdellian geometrical jurisprudence. This characterization can be described as bearing a sense of
closure.
We see then that Cardozo generated two disparate and irreconcilable views of the judicial
process. What, one would like to prod Cardozo, is judging really about? Are legal problems
intractable  [*1048]  or are they solvable? Are legal questions open-ended or are they inevitably
determined? Is judging susceptible to human frailties or is it immune to them? Are decisions created
by judges or are they merely found? In short, is the decision-making process governed by openness,
or is it better characterized as closure?
C. The Candor Debate
 The usefulness of teasing apart Cardozo's off-bench writings from his judicial practice becomes
immediately apparent as we approach the controversy surrounding his candor. The issue of
Cardozo's candor is particularly telling since in the majority of judicial careers, candor is not an
issue at all. In the case of Cardozo, however, views polarized and intensely persisted.
Probably like no other judge of his stature, Cardozo's legacy has been marred by an
"undercurrent of dubiety." n98 Ted White described Cardozo's judicial technique as "retreating
behind conventional techniques of judicial subterfuge - of which he was a master." White added that
his decisions can be "close to being disingenuous." n99 In the view of then-critic John Noonan,
Cardozo's opinions masked the real operations of his decisions. n100 Arthur Corbin, a supporter of
Cardozo, observes that Cardozo "molds doctrine without repudiating it." n101 Posner identifies
instances of suppression of detail and unfair statements of facts and points to Cardozo's talent for
smoothening innovation and concealing change. n102 In the Allegheny College and De Cicco cases,
Cardozo is said to have based his decisions on illusory solutions generated by way of whirling
doctrines in a thaumatrope. n103 In  [*1049]  In re Fowles he is accused of brushing by the relevant
cases on the way to his conclusions. n104 In the Hynes case, he is said to have employed dialectical
gymnastics. n105 Edward Levi described Cardozo's famous MacPherson decision as "a tour de
force of judicial casuistry." n106 And in the familiar Palsgraf case, Cardozo is said to have turned
the doctrine on its head, and having done so without blinking an eye. n107 As Posner observed,
Cardozo's greatness is perceived by many like deceit, concealment, and manipulation; in short, like
the "lawyer's shady arts." n108
At the same time, however, Cardozo has also been singled out as being exceptionally forthright.
Commenting on The Nature of the Judicial Process, Stone, Hough, Learned Hand, and Van Voorhis
explicitly heralded Cardozo for his frankness and sincerity. n109 In a chapter entitled The Candor
of Cardozo, Jerome Frank extolled Cardozo for being "in the forefront of those who realistically
face the unavoidable uncertainties in law, the actualities of judicial law-making." n110 Justice
Burch described Cardozo's work as stripping the sacred garments of mystery off the judicial
process. n111 Justice Brennan praised Cardozo for providing an "honest reflection and candid
confession" of the process  [*1050]  by which judges decide cases. n112
These contradictory assessments of Cardozo's candor manifest the benefit of distinguishing
between Cardozo's judicial and extra-judicial writing. While his reflections on the openness of the
judicial process have engendered nothing but praise and respect for his honesty, the closure he
imposed on his opinions has spurred a sense of dubiety. It is interesting to note that when
commentators appraise his judicial and extra-judicial work combined, the assessments tend to be
mixed. n113
D. Allaying the Discrepancy
 It is curious that even though Cardozo was apparently never criticized for the discrepancy between
the two accounts of judging, he nonetheless attempted to allay it. Essentially, he did so by
downplaying his exposition of the openness of the judicial process. For instance, in The Nature of
the Judicial Process, after having laid out his compelling and detailed account of openness, Cardozo
inserted two disclaimers. First, he claimed that there was "nothing novel" in it. n114 Second, he
sought to minimize the relevance of the account in stating that it applied only to "occasional and
relatively rare" cases. n115 He explained that it is only with a small percentage of cases, "not large
indeed," that "I have chiefly concerned myself in all that I have said to you." n116 In The Growth of
the Law, he quantified this claim: "Nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a court
are predetermined - predetermined in the sense that they are predestined - their fate preestablished
by inevitable laws"; judicial creativity was accordingly confined to only one-tenth of the cases,
perhaps  [*1051]  less. n117
Upon close scrutiny, both of these disclaimers - the nothing-novel claim and the nine-tenths
claim - fall flat. The novelty of The Nature of the Judicial Process is evidenced both by the way it
was received at the time it was published, and by how it has since been judged. Hand predicted that
the book would be received as "the voice of heresy"; that legal orthodoxy would find "a scandal in
so much subjectivity." n118 Stone said that the book "may seem to exhibit radical tendencies." n119
Justice Burch states that Cardozo had "drawn back the veil"; that his account was a "daring" one.
n120 It has also been described by others as a "pioneer work"; n121 something "so brilliantly
different." n122 In the Foreword to the Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Edwin
Patterson describes Cardozo's revelations as "tearing away the veil from the secrets of the
consultation room and the judge's study." n123 Arthur Corbin reports that when Cardozo delivered
the Storrs Lectures at Yale (on which the book is based) the capacity audience was "spell-bound."
n124
Looking back in time, Llewellyn observes that The Nature of the Judicial Process "shocked our
legal world"; n125 while Ted White reports that Cardozo's audience reacted to his book with great
enthusiasm; n126 and Polenberg describes Cardozo's work as having radically subverted the
conventional understanding of judicial decision making. n127 In a similar vein, Brennan stated that
[*1052]  through The Nature of the Judicial Process, "one person was able ... to alter the course of
American legal thought." n128 The book has also been called "a sensational event," n129 nothing
less than "a legal version of hard core pornography." n130
It seems that Cardozo's attempt to mitigate the impact he made on the legal world cannot stand.
It is plainly implausible that the legal community would have responded so enthusiastically to a
stale account of how decisions are made in only a marginal fraction of cases. On the backdrop of the
very real impetus of his writings, Cardozo's by-the-way disclaimers ring hollow. n131
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that Cardozo himself did not fully perceive his
account to be insignificant. n132 Cardozo described The Nature of the Judicial Process as his
"confessions," n133 as "laying bare my own soul and the souls of my associates and telling you
what was going on inside." n134 Corbin observed that Cardozo knew that his conception of the
judicial process was not the generally accepted one. Cardozo himself remarked - though  [*1053]
perhaps tongue in cheek - that if he were to publish The Nature of the Judicial Process, he would be
impeached. n135 Cardozo later stated that it was a "rash" thing to have published the book. n136 It
is further clear from his address before the New York County Lawyers Association in 1931 that he
knew that he was considered a reformer. In his address, he set out to deflect a "fairly general notion
among [his] brethren at the Bar" that he had contributed to a transformation of the judicial process
from its previous "simple, natural, spontaneous" state into one that is "conscious of itself [and]
crafty like the serpent." n137
II
WHAT TO MAKE OF THE DISCREPANCY?
We turn now to the second part of this essay, in which I will examine the maintenance of the
discrepancy between Cardozo's explicit account of judging and the account that was implicit in his
practice as a judge. Three explanations are explored.
A. Deception
One explanation is that Cardozo was simply deceitful in the sense that he intentionally misled us
to believe one of the accounts while knowing that it was false. n138 That would be the case had he
believed that judging was a complex process, susceptible to human fallibility, requiring judicial
creation and choice, and resulting in subjective imprecise results. But he nonetheless consciously
denied all of this in the opinions he wrote. Alternatively, it would be considered deceit had he
believed that judging is an impersonal process by which judges merely find law's inevitable
[*1054]  conclusions, but he described the process as one of openness. Cardozo certainly described
his life project as one driven by genuine truth seeking, even soul searching. n139 And
notwithstanding charges of disingenuousness leveled by latter-day scholars, n140 those who
surrounded him considered him to be a man of integrity. n141 It seems doubtful that Cardozo was
plainly deceitful; if he were, evidence to that effect would have likely shown up elsewhere. Before
denouncing him for deceit (and rebuking two generations of scholars for excessive gullibility), we
ought to explore alternative explanations.
B. Self-Deception
A second explanation for the maintenance of the discrepancies is that Cardozo deceived himself.
That is, he believed one of the accounts, but somehow convinced himself in the veracity of the
other. Self-deception has traditionally been modeled on the basis of intentional deception-of-others,
in which the person is perceived to be simultaneously holding contradictory beliefs - i.e., that of
believing both P and not P.
For philosophers, this concept has posed a persistent difficulty: since a person cannot believe
what she disbelieves, she cannot deceive herself. Self-deception has thus traditionally been viewed
as a paradox and, therefore, an impossibility. Jean Paul Sartre, for example, explained: "It follows
first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which
means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my
capacity as the one deceived." n142 This difficulty, dubbed the epistemological paradox, is
accompanied by a similarly perplexing paradox of a moral kind. In his classic work, Herbert
Finagrette explained that the moral quandary is borne by the fact that ignorance and blindness tend
to exculpate, while knowledge, insight and foresight inculpate; both judgments fit a person in a state
of self-deception. n143
 [*1055]  Various avenues have been explored in the philosophical literature to avoid this
epistemological paradox and its ensuing moral rejoinder. Much of this work, however, has shifted
the debate from one paradigmatic set of questions to another. The discussion has turned away from
examining the classic situations of holding contradictory beliefs to situations in which a person
holds on to a belief in the face of incoming counter-evidence.
This latter paradigm, dubbed belief persistence, examines instances such as mothers overlooking
their children's dishonesty, people denying symptoms of terminal illnesses, and lovers ignoring
signs of infidelity. n144 In this paradigm, the epistemological paradox is solved, or circumvented,
by means of distinguishing between different levels of consciousness, and by means of discerning
biases in the way the threatening evidence is processed. n145 However, as scholars of self-
deception come to rely increasingly on psychological theories to explain the problem of belief
persistence, a different field of psychology is becoming available to solve the more problematic
cases of holding contradictory beliefs.
C. Self-Complexity and Mental Compartmentalization
The third explanation is based on a body of self-theories, a branch of personality-psychology
that examines personality and human behavior largely through the construct of the self-concept.
Generally speaking, the self-concept consists of a person's view, perception, and evaluation of him
or herself. One of the tenets of self-theories, as postulated by William James, is that a person's
actions and beliefs are strongly reflected in their self-concepts. n146  [*1056]  The self-concept is
employed in a variety of domains, including the formation of identity and role-conceptions, n147
the regulation of behavior, n148 the maintenance of one's public image, n149 and social perception.
n150
A core insight offered by self-theories is the repudiation of the image of the self as a monolithic,
unitary entity, as it has prevailed in the rationalist tradition. n151 Instead, their view resonates with
Irving Goffman's Dramaturgy Theory in which people are likened to actors, constantly playing
different roles on the different stages of their lives. n152 Self-theorists view the self as a construct
[*1057]  that varies significantly across time and space. n153 People have different aspects or
identities, which are influenced by social situations, role expectations, audiences, goals, mood
states, or by combinations of these and other variables. n154 For example, imagine a person who is
a teacher, a researcher, a parent, a spouse, a tennis player, and a friend. Which of these self-aspects,
or identities, will be prominent at a given time is contingent on the particular situation, encounter or
relationship one is experiencing at that moment. n155
This observation of the variability and multiplicity of self-aspects has significant consequences
for the self-concept. The self-concept that emerges in the literature is that of a differentiated, n156
multifaceted, n157 dynamic, n158 and flexible n159 construct.  [*1058]  We are talking of an
aggregate of self-aspects that are constructed and activated to fit the particulars of given situations.
n160 John Kihlstrom and Stanley Klein have concluded: "Each of us possesses a repertoire of
context-specific self-concepts - a sense of what we are like in different classes of situations." n161
This view of the self raises serious questions with respect to the structure of the self-concept.
n162 How elaborate is this construct? How does the self organize this array of aspects? To what
extent do the individual aspects relate to one another? Are there systematic relationships among the
various self-aspects? This paper does not purport to offer a general model of the structure of the
self-concept. For our current purposes, it is sufficient that we focus on the interrelatedness of self-
aspects within the structure of the self.
It is becoming increasingly evident that it is not only the content of one's self-knowledge that is
important in determining its significance, but also the way in which that knowledge relates to and
interacts with other aspects of the self. n163 Patricia Linville offered a model of the self that is
based on a large associative network. She explained: "Not all self-aspects are activated at any given
time. Rather, specific self-aspects are activated depending on such factors as the context and
associated thoughts, their relation to currently activated self-aspects, and their recency and
frequency of activation." n164
In such associative networks, the more strongly related the self-aspects, the more they influence
one another; in Linville's  [*1059]  terms, they "spill over to color thoughts and feelings about the
other." n165 A self structure that consists of a great number of self-aspects which are unrelated or
weakly interrelated is characterized by Linville as high in self-complexity. n166 Similarly, Carolin
Showers referred to such self structures as ones that are high in compartmentalization. n167 A
compartmentalized self is one in which there is a relatively high degree of isolation and insulation
among the self-aspects. When a self-concept is compartmentalized, its self-aspects will tend not to
spill over into other aspects of the self and not to be affected by them in return. n168
Compartmentalization, it must be appreciated, is an effective apparatus in our cognitive toolbox.
It enables people to efficiently process different kinds of self-relevant information, to act a greater
number of roles, and to respond to a wider array of demands in a variety of situations. n169 Turner
suggested that a compartmentalized personal organization is a useful way of handling conflicting
situations, in that "one can 'be' whichever role provides the more favorable evaluation in the
situation at hand." n170 Philosopher Amelie Rorty underscores the benefits that follow from
compartmentalization and other capacities that inhibit the integration of the self. n171
Compartmentalization relieves us of the need to coordinate, criticize, or change our beliefs
merely because they contradict beliefs that are better suited for different situations. It is important to
note that beliefs do not necessarily erase previously held ones: "Belief systems may be like works in
progress - a potpourri of compatible, semi-contradictory, and totally contradictory ideas." n172
Indeed, this view of the compartmentalized self-concept corresponds to a larger body of research
demonstrating the  [*1060]  existence of multiplicity and contradiction within attitudes, n173
norms, n174 and theories of human perception. n175 This view also corresponds to psychodynamic
theories that emphasize the defensive function served by insulating contradictory aspects of the self.
n176
 [*1061]  It is important to note that compartmentalization not only enables the adoption of
discrepant positions, it also serves an ancillary function of keeping the discrepancy out of one's
awareness. n177 The insulation of the inconsistent self-aspects avoids recognition of the
incompatibilities, thus preventing any discomfort that might otherwise have been experienced. n178
In sum, Rorty claims: "The structures and capacities that enable us to manipulate ourselves in
situations of indeterminacy allow self-deception as an unintended, tangential consequence." n179
This approach to the self-concept, however, must not be taken to mean that the self consists only
of disjoined fragments of selfhood. n180 Compartmentalization is never complete. Rather, it is a
relative feature. Healthy, adaptive people always have some degree  [*1062]  of integration within
their self-concepts; that is part of what characterizes us as individuals and makes us distinguishable
from one another. n181 Kihlstrom and Klein propose that people's multiple self-aspects are
governed by some personal "self-prototype," n182 Seymour Epstein suggests that a personality
structure is stabilized by means of broad postulates, n183 and Markus and Wurf offer a model of the
self-concept that consists of a stable core and a malleable periphery. n184 People vary on this
dimension, that is, self-concepts range from relatively high degrees of integration to high degrees of
compartmentalization. n185
When applied to the question of self-deception, this model of self-compartmentalization
overcomes the difficulties that have traditionally plagued the debate. Instead of a paradoxical view
of the self, it is possible to conceive of people holding incompatible, even contradictory, beliefs,
more or less contemporaneously, as long as they can successfully compartmentalize the respective
self-aspects from one another. n186
 [*1063]  Before turning to apply this approach to attain a better understanding of Cardozo, or
any other judge for that matter, one might first pause to consider the following objection. This
positive framework might unduly distract us from a needed normative evaluation. Labeling
discrepant accounts as instances of self-complexity and compartmentalization draws us into a
technical framework that runs the danger of ignoring possible ethical dimensions of people acting in
ways that deviate from the accounts they give for their behavior. This is particularly acute with
respect to functionaries vested with extensive powers over our social lives, and whose discretion is
moderated primarily by their self-restraint. Perhaps we ought to condemn such people for failing to
integrate their self-aspects, even if their deeds fall short of intentional misleading. Thus we could
enunciate an affirmative duty to compare and integrate self-conceptions. Perhaps we ought to attach
stricter sanctions to discrepancies that are borne and maintained by self-complexity and mental
compartmentalization, or relax the definition of what amounts to a lie or a hypocrisy. n187
However, the development of such a moral framework extends well beyond the boundaries of this
essay.
D. Back to Cardozo
This theoretical framework brings us closer to understanding the discrepancy that pervades
Cardozo's work. As stated, to understand this man and his legacy we must substitute the prevailing
view of Cardozo's legacy as a single, uniform project with an approach that isolates the aspects of
the person that correspond to his profound inconsistencies. In particular, we should focus on the
differences between Cardozo, the commentator on judging, and Cardozo, the judge. An interesting
question is why did Cardozo  [*1064]  endorse such disparate characterizations of the judicial
process? Why, in other words, did he expose himself to the risk of criticism (though the fact that
this discrepancy has gone unnoticed suggests that he did not take much of a risk)? More generally,
one would wonder whether there is something about the judicial function that promotes - and
possibly benefits from - the emergence of disparate roles and inconsistent self-conceptions.
Let us begin by examining what causes judges to impose closure on their opinions. Like any
complex social practice, judicial practice is multiply-determined. One natural candidate is the
notion that closure serves the judicial function well. n188 This functional explanation is based on
the belief that closure enhances the acceptability of the decisions, in that putative obviousness,
inevitableness, and correctness carry more conviction. Concurrently, the seeming necessity of
deciding in the only possible way minimizes judges' exposure to criticism. In this sense, closure is a
self-perpetuating judicial style. Judges convey this implicit style as the standard of good judging,
and the legal community expects nothing less.
This functional explanation is all too familiar. Indeed, it was operative in Cardozo's approach to
his work. Like Holmes before him, n189 Cardozo was well aware of the value of closure. He stated
critically that "discretion, unmeasured and unregulated, is felt to open the door to tyranny and
corruption." n190 Elsewhere he lamented: "As if judges must lose respect and confidence by the
reminder that they are subject to human limitations." n191 Indeed, he brought this insight to bare in
his own opinions by imparting opinions that were distinctly doubtless, obviously correct, and pre-
determined. n192 It goes without saying  [*1065]  that Cardozo would never have made his way
onto the Supreme Court and into the coveted pantheon had his opinions revealed the openness he
described in his off-bench writing. Great reputations are rarely based on opinions that are
admittedly filled with cracks, crevices, and loopholes, n193 and on decisions reached by groping for
light and by testing and re-testing hypotheses. n194
The functional explanation is supplemented and reinforced by the fact that closure is a naturally
occurring cognitive phenomenon that accompanies mental tasks of the kind involved in legal
decision-making. In a series of experiments performed by cognitive psychologist Keith Holyoak
and myself, we examined such mental processes and identified something that we have called the
coherence bias. n195 In brief, this research identifies some natural, though artifactual, consequences
of mental processes of the kind judges perform. The findings show that even in the face of complex,
difficult, underdetermined tasks, people ultimately experience their decisions as being solidly
determined by the arguments and thus singularly correct. Accordingly, they report high levels of
confidence in the decisions. It follows then that the judge's phenomenological experience of closure
is largely genuine, rather than being a form of posturing or a means of persuasion. It is interesting to
note that Cardozo's off-bench account of judicial decision making is virtually identical to this
psychological explanation of the process. n196
 [*1066]  At the same time, a judge seeking insights into the judicial process is bound to render
an account of openness. This is particularly true for an introspective judge; and few judges have
shown the kind of introspection that emerges from Cardozo's account. Indeed, in the eyes of many
(myself included), his insights are the most enlightening and valuable description of the mental
processes involved in judicial decision making. n197 But over and above providing insight, his
account was part of a broader project of updating jurisprudence and bringing it into line with
modern thinking. Two decades into the twentieth century, the essentialist and foundationalist
approaches to law could no longer be taken seriously. To be considered plausible, an account of
judging required a concession to the imperfection of conceptual orderliness, to the fallibility of
judges, and to the inevitable subjectivity and contingency of judicial decisions.
As Richard Weisberg has pointed out, Cardozo was caught in a difficult existential dilemma.
n198 As revealed most clearly in an address he made before the New York State Bar Association in
1932, he was torn between the new faith of the judicial realists on the one hand, and the bar and
bench's "quest for certainty" on the other. Throughout the lengthy address, he both endorsed and
criticized the intellectual program of the realists. n199 Rather than solve the dilemma, Cardozo
alternated skillfully and unnoticeably between its two horns. Thus, by admitting to the openness of
the judicial process he appeals to our contemporary, sophisticated sensibilities, while his insistence
on its closure made for more effective judging. It is apparent that Cardozo enjoyed  [*1067]  the
benefits of propagating both positions. Indeed, his extra-judicial account bolstered the credibility of
his judicial image, while his off-bench reflections were heightened by his stature as a judge. n200
One of the striking things about Cardozo is the perfection with which he performed each of the
contradictory capacities. The way in which he seems to have both internalized, and dissociated
himself from, the two roles suggests that his mental compartmentalization was profound.
In this regard, he was very different from Holmes. As Tom Grey has shown, the legacy of
Holmes is not free of complexities. As a legal theorist, Holmes is best known for his propagation of
a jurisprudence that was anti-conceptualist, experientialist and pragmatist. Less familiar is his
exaltation of adherence to precedent and deference to legislatures. This ambivalence carried over
into his judicial work. Notwithstanding some memorable opinions - most of which were dissents -
that accentuated his anti-conceptualism, Holmes' general stance seems to have been devoted to the
attainment of a conceptual ordering of doctrines and adherence to precedent and legislative will.
n201
In contrast to Cardozo, however, Holmes was forthright about the tension, and he provided an
explanation that suited his elitist, detached personality. While conceding that certainty was illusory
and that rules were invariably underdetermined, he urged that law should be followed nonetheless -
if for no better reason than that the law was there. n202 Unlike Cardozo, on the rare occasions
[*1068]  in which Holmes substituted his formalist stance with that of a reformer, he explicitly
announced the change of roles. n203 It is interesting to note that Holmes' candor has not been
placed under serious doubt.
Role-theorists explain that when people excel in their roles, they tend to internalize the related
attitudes and behaviors. n204 Typically, this internalization generates some carry-over effect into
other aspects of the self. n205 In Cardozo's case, it seems that neither role had any such effect. He
performed both of these incompatible functions masterfully, and his excellence in the one role did
not hinder his performance in the other. This unusual degree of compartmentalization might be
attributable to Cardozo's complex, protean personality. n206
 [*1069]   
III
CARDOZO'S ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE
Before we can appreciate the significance of Cardozo's legacy, we should first ask to what
extent his account of the judicial function is still relevant in contemporary legal thought.
A. Contemporary Accounts of the Judicial Function
In the vast majority of current off-bench writing about the judicial process, judges continue to
depict an image of openness. Judge Kaye states that the idea that appellate decision making is
devoid of judicial creation amounts to "intellectual nonsense." n207 Former Judge Wachtler states
that "the former characterization has long given way to the frank recognition that judicial evolution
... is, call it what you will, really a distinct form of lawmaking." n208 Judge Aldisert observes that
judicial lawmaking is "now widely accepted." n209 Justice Traynor states that today's judge is
"necessarily an active analyst and not a passive oracle." n210 Making judicial decisions, Justice
Pollock explains, is "unavoidably creative," n211 and requires "myriad choices at every step." n212
Judge Keeton describes judicial lawmaking as an "inevitable need." n213 Moreover, the creative
character of judging is considered by many judges to be normatively desirable. n214
 [*1070]  However, it would be erroneous to conclude that these depictions of openness
accurately reflect the dominant legal culture. A quick glance in the case law produced by courts
reveals that these off-bench statements fail to reflect the reality of the way law is actually applied.
As some astute critics have insisted, although officially pronounced dead, legal formalism continues
to dominate judicial reasoning. n215 The majority of judicial opinions actually generated in
courtrooms across the country continue to sound as if discovering extant law is the primary modus
operandi of judging. n216 Posner observed that most decisions are couched in a "vocabulary of
apodictic certainty," n217 and purport to have been dictated by authoritative legal standards. n218
Eskridge and Frickey have similarly criticized opinions for being wooden, overstated, and one-
sided. n219 Duncan Kennedy emphasizes the putative  [*1071]  inevitableness of opinions. n220
Scott Altman notes that most judicial opinions are written as if the outcome were obvious and void
of doubt. n221 Thus, judicial argument continues to be described as an act of discovery, n222 and to
be framed in a rhetoric of inevitability, n223 and closure. n224
This is not to say that nothing has happened to judicial reasoning in the wake of the Realist
Revolution. The pragmatic espousal of policy as a form of legal argument - a second centerpiece of
Cardozo's theory of adjudication n225 - has changed much about the way we engage in legal
argument. But the account of judging - the depiction of the fallible, subjective, creator judge - is
notably absent from the judicial practice.
 [*1072]  We see then that the current judicial practice exists under an intensive, though
generally ignored, dialectic tension between the characterization of openness and the practice of
closure. The Realist Revolution's successful slaying of the dragons of conceptualism, objectivism,
and foundationalism has left the judicial function in an epistemological morass and an institutional
crisis. n226 Contemporary judges continue to feel pulled by the professional and institutional need
to provide certainty and conceptual order, and thus resort to a narrative of obviousness, lack of
doubt, adherence to past authorities, and impersonality. n227 Opinions that depict the decisions as
having been determined by someone or something other than the judges themselves serve to ward
off the persistent countermajoritarian objection. n228 On the other hand, judges can hardly stand by
the implications of admitting to the account of closure. This characterization of the law and of their
work is simply unconvincing.
To maintain its legitimacy and intellectual stature, the judicial branch needs more than its
prescribed constitutional powers and the sheer force it exerts through the rhetoric of its opinions.
Judges must also win over their wariest of audiences - critical students of the law. Thus, judges have
no alternative but to admit that the law is not a gapless system and that judging necessarily entails
openness.
On rare occasions, courts are called to bring the opposing accounts of the judicial function into
consideration. Such was the case of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, n229 in which the
U.S. Supreme Court decided a question regarding the retroactivity  [*1073]  of the application of
one of its own decisions. Speaking for a plurality, Justice Souter supported the retroactive
application based on a view that the traditional function of courts is to decide cases in accordance
with their "best current understanding of the law." n230 Most notably, Justice Souter explained that
this "reflects the declaratory theory of law, according to which the courts are understood only to
find the law, not to make it." n231 In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, Justice Scalia elaborated the meaning of the court's power "to say what the law is," as
pronounced in Marbury v. Madison. n232 He explained:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in
a real sense "make" law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were "finding" it - discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what
it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. n233
 Probably more than any other contemporary judicial expression, the notion that judges make law
but do so as though they were "finding" it, encapsulates and manifests the judicial duplicity inherent
in the judicial process.
This duplicity has not been lost on the astute judges. Posner explained most judges believe that
their effectiveness depends on "a belief by the public that judges are finders rather than makers of
law." n234 He also cautioned us from being misled by the fact that judges and their defenders "emit
a continuous stream of disclaimers that judges exercise power." n235 Judge Mikva explains that
most judges "deny that they are making policy even when they do fill in the gaps." n236 In a similar
vein, Judge Wald comments that "while judges still typically write as if they were absolutely certain
about the rightness and soundness of their analysis and decisions, everyone (including the judges)
knows that's not necessarily the case." n237 Indeed, Cardozo himself was aware of  [*1074]  judges'
denial of the double-consciousness. He spoke of the tendency of judges "to disguise the innovation
even from themselves, and to announce in all sincerity that it was all as it had been before." n238
The sensitivity of judges to the limits of their power is not lost on commentators of judging. n239
In sum, like Cardozo in his time, contemporary judges hold on to two disparate
characterizations of their practice. In their judicial capacity they operate as if legal decisions can be
shut as readily as they are opened, while from an extra-judicial perspective they insist that closure is
nothing but a fiction. Thus, judges effectively operate in two disparate roles and alternate between
two disparate states of consciousness. To perform successfully, they must keep these contradictory
roles apart. They do so by compartmentalizing their self-concepts.
B. Cardozo's Continued Presence
We can now turn to examine the relationship between Cardozo's legacy and contemporary legal
thought. One of the most obvious indicia of a judicial legacy is the frequency with which the judge
is cited and the extent to which her writings are relied upon. As Posner has shown, Cardozo's legacy
is based upon a solid, testable professional reputation. His opinions are cited  [*1075]  more heavily
than those of even more distinguished judges of his time. This is true both for his work on the New
York Court of Appeals and on the U.S. Supreme Court. n240 For instance, in a recent examination
of the case law of the state of Georgia, Cardozo's legacy was found to dominate those of John
Marshall and Holmes. n241
The significance of Cardozo's legacy becomes even more apparent when we examine the
widespread endorsement of his extra-judicial writing. A survey of judges' off-bench literature
indicates that no other account of judging has been heralded so consistently by judges - particularly
by those who also engage in extra-judicial writing (and these tend to be reputable and influential
judges). Cardozo's account is the most frequently invoked to prop up the depiction of judicial
discretion, creativity, subjectivity and the like. A number of judges, including Shirley Abrahamson,
n242 Ruggero Aldisert, n243 Henry Friendly, n244 and Judith Kaye n245 have written entire
articles embracing Cardozo's account. Former Justice William Brennan based his now famous plea
for passion in judging on Cardozo's account of openness. n246 Cardozo's account has been
celebrated also in the writings of  [*1076]  Charles Breitel, n247 Charles Clark, n248 Joseph
Grodin, n249 Robert Keeton, n250 Alvin Rubin, n251 Walter Schaefer, n252 John Paul Stevens,
n253 Sol Wachtler, n254 and Patricia Wald. n255
This brings us closer to the completion of the proposed understanding of Cardozo's place in
contemporary legal theory. Cardozo is the quintessential model of a judges' judge. He provides a
prototypical solution for the conflict judges experience due to the incompatible roles they are
assigned to play. When reflecting on the practice from afar, judges can comfortably resort to
Cardozo's admission that, at bottom, the process is infused with openness. And when sitting on the
bench and deciding cases, they impose closure on the complexity of issues just as that great judge
did.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a significant proportion of the judges who resort to Cardozo's
account of openness, also invoke the nine-tenths, perhaps more disclaimer. That is, while insisting
on the creative nature of judging, they disclaim its significance by confining it to a marginal fraction
of cases. n256 The  [*1077]  legacy of Cardozo, then, serves subsequent generations of judges not
only in that it facilitates the maintenance of the contradictory accounts, but also in that it helps keep
the discrepancy out of their awareness. It should come as no surprise that the list of Cardozo's most
devoted followers are judges; his critics are mostly law professors.
C. Some Troubling Implications
Cardozo seemed to have failed to heed his own admonition that "the virtues of symmetry and
coherence can be purchased at too high a price." n257 His own legacy is exemplary in exposing the
cost of imposing putative closure. His attempts to portray law's inherent under-determinacy as
gapless, were achieved by means of some distortion of the legal materials and transgression of the
jurisprudence employed, thus precipitating the wrath of his critics. n258 It is likely that the critics
have been particularly disconcerted because his questionable jurisprudence was immersed in, and
veiled by, his all-too-persuasive rhetoric. n259
It is important to appreciate that the widespread endorsement  [*1078]  of Cardozo's account of
openness bears little impact on the actual practice of judging. As stated above, the style of closure
that is imposed on decisions day by day throughout the judiciary system, dominates judicial
discourse and thus affects the ways by which law is made, developed, and executed. In contrast, the
account of openness is confined primarily to academic exchanges, commencement addresses and
occasional confirmation hearings. The evidence thus far indicates that even those judges who
vociferously espouse openness in their off-bench writing, tend to produce opinions that do not differ
substantially from the widespread style of closure. n260 Once again, Cardozo is exemplary, as
evidenced by the fundamental antithesis between his style of judging and his revealing account.
n261
Herein lies an irony. Not only has the extra-judicial account of openness failed to influence the
way cases are decided and opinions are written, but it seems to be bastioning the formal, rigid style
of judging. The fact that in off-bench writing, prominent and sophisticated judges depict the judicial
process in a realistic and plausible light has the effect of distinguishing and distancing  [*1079]  it
from the discredited Langdellian orthodoxy which it so approximates. In other words, the
concession of openness enables judges to pay homage to the expectations of their critical audiences,
while continuing to render unrealistic, inflated and exaggerated judicial opinions. At the end of the
day, the account Cardozo propagated lends undeserved credibility and thus confers legitimacy on
the ever problematic judicial process.
I have argued elsewhere that the style of closure is an undesirable mode of judicial reasoning,
n262 foremost, because it compromises the integrity of the judicial opinion. Opinions that overstate
the obviousness and inevitableness of decisions fail to attend to the nuanced conflict and complexity
that pervade our social world. The unrealistic depiction of the law tends also to obfuscate the real
and appropriate grounds for the decision, and thus blunts the guidance it might lend for future cases.
There is, I contend, much to gain by substituting the style of closure with a more realistic, pragmatic
jurisprudence. n263 Right now, however, the prospects for any real transformation appear rather
slim. n264
Judicial opinions deserve serious attention because of their formative impact on legal discourse.
n265 The words of judges serve as a medium through which generations of lawyers are trained,
socialized and professionalized. It is through judicial texts that the legal community learns how to
converse in legal language and how to harness the power of legal reasoning. Judges are the primary
role models whom we emulate when we learn how to function within the field of law. n266 Judicial
opinions, then, set the standards for the levels of ingenuousness and conviction with which we hold
beliefs and advocate them in the name of others. I offer that the multiplicity of levels of
consciousness emitted by judges sets a tone of duplicity throughout  [*1080]  legal discourse, and
this might be a contributing factor to the crisis of faith that is said to pervade the legal community.
n267
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that Cardozo's legacy is best understood not as a single corpus, but rather as an
uneasy hybrid of two thoroughly inconsistent bodies of work. In his extra-judicial writing about
judicial decision-making, he candidly exposed the creativity, fallibility, and subjectivity inherent in
the process; as a judge, he conveyed a distinct sense of inevitableness, certitude, and objectivity.
The judicial role continues to be pulled apart as it was in Cardozo's day. To succeed in their
office, contemporary judges sense the need to comply with the polity's expectations and satisfy the
perceived demands of their role, while also addressing the concerns of skeptical onlookers. Thus,
performing in the judicial capacity, a judge is drawn towards imposing closure on the opinions,
while a judge engaged in providing an accurate and introspective account of her activity is bound to
expose its openness.
An effective way to survive and thrive in this testing environment is to compartmentalize one's
self-concept, as Cardozo himself did so remarkably. Cardozo was an astute expositor of the human
functioning, but also a concealer of his own doing. His insightful account serves current judges well
in that it provides them with a favorable conception of their activity and of themselves as they
continue to produce opinions forged in the dubious mold he helped perpetuate. Indeed, it is the very
contrariness and conflict embodied in his work that makes him so vital. Understanding the
reputation of this complex figure thus helps us better understand the double-consciousness of the
judicial function and the contradictory nature of our legal system.
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